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Complex social behaviors lie at the heart of many of the challenges facing evolutionary biol-
ogy, sociology, economics, and beyond. For evolutionary biologists in particular the question
is often how such behaviors can arise de novo in a simple evolving system. How can group
behaviors such as collective action, or decision making that accounts for memories of past
experience, emerge and persist? Evolutionary game theory provides a framework for for-
malizing these questions and admitting them to rigorous study. Here we develop such a
framework to study the evolution of sustained collective action in multi-player public-goods
games, in which players have arbitrarily long memories of prior rounds of play and can react
to their experience in an arbitrary way. To study this problem we construct a coordinate
system for memory-m strategies in iterated n-player games that permits us to characterize
all the cooperative strategies that resist invasion by any mutant strategy, and thus stabilize
cooperative behavior. We show that while larger games inevitably make cooperation harder
to evolve, there nevertheless always exists a positive volume of strategies that stabilize co-
operation provided the population size is large enough. We also show that, when games are
small, longer-memory strategies make cooperation easier to evolve, by increasing the num-
ber of ways to stabilize cooperation. Finally we explore the co-evolution of behavior and
memory capacity, and we find that longer-memory strategies tend to evolve in small games,
which in turn drives the evolution of cooperation even when the benefits for cooperation
are low.
Behavioral complexity is a pervasive feature of organisms that engage in social interactions. Rather
then making the same choices all the time – always cooperate, or never cooperate – organisms behave
differently depending on their social environment or their past experience. The need to understand be-
havioral complexity is at the heart of many important challenges facing evolutionary biology as well as
the social sciences, or indeed any problem in which social interactions play a part. Cooperative social
interactions in particular play a central role in many of the major evolutionary transitions, from the
emergence of multi-cellular life to the development of human language [1].
Evolutionary biologists have been successful in pinpointing biological and environmental factors that
influence the emergence of cooperation in a population. The demographic and spatial structure of pop-
ulations in particular have emerged as fundamentally important factors [2–8]. At the other end of the
scale, the underlying mechanisms of cooperation – such as the genetic architectures that encode social
traits, or the ability of public goods to diffuse in the environment – also place constraints on how and to
what extent cooperation will evolve [9–13].
Despite extensive progress for simple interactions, an understanding of the evolution of cooperation
when social interactions occur repeatedly – so that individuals can update their behavior in the light of
past experience – and involve multiple participants simultaneously, remains elusive. Some of the most
promising approaches for tackling this problem come from the study of iterated games [1,2,14–17,20,21].
In the language of game theory, behavioural updates in light of past experience are modelled as a strategy
in an iterated multi-player game among heterogenous individuals. Even when we limit ourselves to a small
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set of relatively simple strategies in such games, the resulting evolutionary dynamics are often surprising
and counter-intuitive. As we begin to allow for a wider array of ever more complex behaviors, results on
the emergence of cooperation are correspondingly harder to pin down.
In this paper we study evolving populations composed of individuals playing arbitrary strategies in
iterated, multiplayer games. We focus on the prospects for cooperation in public-goods games, and we
investigate how these prospects depend on the number of players that simultaneously participate in the
game, on the memory capacity of the players, and on the total population size. We then study the co-
evolution of players’ strategies alongside their capacity to remember prior interactions. We arrive at a
simple insight: when games involve few players, longer memory strategies tend to evolve, which in turn
increases the amount of cooperation that can persist. And so populations tend to progress from short
memories and selfish behavior to long memories and cooperation.
1 Results
We study the evolution of cooperation in iterated public-goods games, in which n players repeatedly
choose whether to cooperate by contributing a cost C to a public pool, producing a public benefit B > C.
In each round of iterated play the total benefit produced due to all player’s contributions is divided equally
between all players. Thus, if k players choose to cooperate in a given round, each player receives a benefit
Bk/n. We study finite populations of N players engaging in infinitely iterated n-player public-goods
games, using strategies with memory length m, meaning a player can remember how many times she and
her opponents cooperated across the preceding m rounds (Figure 1).
We focus on the evolution of sustained collective action, meaning the evolution of strategies that,
when used by each member of the population, produce an equilibrium play with all players cooperating
each round. This may be thought of as the best possible social outcome of the game, because it produces
the maximum total public good. We contrast the prospects for sustained cooperation with the prospects
for sustained inaction, meaning strategies that, when used by each member of the population, produce
an equilibrium play with all players defecting each round. This may be thought of as the worst possible
social outcome of the game, because it results in no public good being produced at all.
To study the evolutionary prospects of collective action and inaction we determine the “volume of
robust strategies” that produce sustained cooperation or defection in a repeated n-player game, in which
players have memory m. The game is played in a well-mixed population, composed of N haploid individ-
uals who reproduce according to a “copying process” based on their payoffs (Figure 1) [7]. The volume
of robust strategies measures how much cooperation or defection will evolve across many generations [3].
More specifically, this volume is the probability that a randomly drawn strategy that produces sustained
cooperation (or defection) can resist invasion by all other possible strategies that do not produce sustained
cooperation (or defection) [2, 3, 8, 25, 26]. As we have shown previously [3], the volumes of robust strate-
gies determine the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation and defection in iterated games. We confirm the
utility of this approach by comparing our analytical predictions to Monte Carlo simulations, studying the
effects of population size, game size, and memory capacity on the evolution of cooperation.
We begin our analysis by describing a coordinate system under which the volume of robust strategies
can be determined analytically, for games of size n, played in populations of size N , in which strategies
have memory length m. We use this coordinate system to completely characterize all evolutionary robust
cooperating (and defecting) strategies, which cannot be invaded by any non-cooperating (or non-defecting)
mutants, in the iterated n-player public-goods game. We apply these results to make specific predictions
for the effects of game size and of memory capacity on the evolution of collective action through sustained
cooperation. Finally we explore the consequences of these predictions for the co-evolution of cooperation
and memory capacity itself.
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Figure 1: Multiplayer games and memory. We study the evolution of behavior in iterated n-player public-
goods games in which players use strategies with memory capacitym. We consider a replicating population
of N individuals who each receive a payoff from engaging in an infinitely iterated game with all possible
subsets of (n− 1) opponents in the population. Players then reproduce according to a “copying process”,
in which a player X copies another player’s strategy Y with a probability fX→Y = 11+exp[σ(SX−SY )] where
SX and SY are the player’s respective payoffs and σ scales the strength of selection. We consider the
case of strong selection, such that a rare mutant who is at a selective disadvantage is quickly lost from
the population [3]. We investigate the success of cooperative strategies as a function of game size and
the length of players’ memories. We determine the frequency of robust cooperative strategies, which
can resist invasion by any possible mutant. (Top) Depending on the size of the game n relative to the
population N , the dynamics of public-goods games are different. In a two-player game, a series of pairwise
interactions occur in the population at each generation (left). If the whole population plays the game
each generation (right) all players interact simultaneously. (Bottom) Memory of past events results in
strategies that update behavior depending on the histories of both players’ actions. This allows for more
complex strategies, such as those that punish rare defection or reward rare cooperation.
1.1 Beyond two-player games and memory-1 strategies
Recently, Press and Dyson introduced so-called zero determinant (ZD) strategies in iterated two-player
games [1]. ZD strategies are of interest because, when a player unilaterally adopts such a strategy she
enforces a linear relationship between her longterm payoff and that of her opponent, and thereby gains
some measure of control over the outcome of the game [27–31]. Several authors have worked to extend
the framework of Press and Dyson to multi-player games [29,32] and have characterized multi-player ZD
strategies, revealing a number of interesting properties.
Other research has expanded the framework of Press and Dyson to study all possible memory-1 strate-
gies for infinitely repeated, two-player games [2, 3, 8, 25, 26]. This work involves developing a coordinate
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system for the space of all memory-1 strategies [2] that allows us to describe a straightforward (although
not necessarily linear) relationship between the two players’ longterm payoffs. This relationship between
players’ longterm payoffs, in turn, has enabled us to fully characterize all memory-1 Nash equilibria and all
evolutionary robust strategies for infinitely repeated two-player games, played in a replicating population
of N individuals [2, 3, 8, 26].
Here we generalize this body of work by developing a coordinate system for the space of memory-
m strategies in multi-player games of size n, such that all n players’ longterm payoffs are related in a
straightforward (although not necessarily linear) way. One essential trick that enables us to achieve this
goal is to construct a mapping between memory-m strategies in an n-player game and memory-1 strategies
in an associated n ×m-player game. We then construct a coordinate system for the space of memory-1
strategies in multi-player games that allows us to easily characterize the cooperating and the defecting
strategies that resist invasion. We apply these techniques to the case of iterated n-player public-goods
games and we precisely characterize all evolutionary robust memory-m strategies – i.e. those strategies
that, when resident in a finite population of N players, can resist selective invasion by all other possible
strategies – thereby elucidating the prospects for the evolution of cooperation in a very general setting.
1.2 A coordinate system for long-memory strategies in multi-player games
Our goal is to study the effects of game size and memory on the frequency and nature of collective action in
public-goods games. Allowing for long-memory strategies and games with more than two players greatly
expands the potential for behavioral complexity, because players are able to react to the behaviors of
multiple opponents across multiple prior interactions. And so merely determining the payoffs received
by players in such an iterated public-goods game can pose a significant challenge. In order to tackle this
problem we develop a coordinate system for parameterizing strategies, in which the outcome of a game
between multiple players using long-memory strategies can nonetheless be easily understood.
A player using a memory-m strategy chooses her play in each round of an iterated game in a way
that depends on the history of plays by all n players across the preceding m rounds. In general such a
strategy consists of 2n×m probabilities for cooperation in the present round. We write the probability for
cooperation of a focal player in its most general form as pσ0,σ1,σ2, . . . ,σn−1 ∈ [0, 1] where σi denotes the
history of plays for player i. Each σi corresponds to an ordered sequence of m plays for player i, with
each entry taking the value c (cooperate) or d (defect). The 2n×m probabilities for cooperation form a
basis for R2n×m and constitute a system of coordinates for the space of memory-m strategies in n-player
games. In the supporting information we describe in detail how to construct of an alternate coordinate
system of 2n×m vectors that also form a basis for R2n×m , and which greatly simplifies the analysis of
long-term payoffs in iterated games. Below we describe this alternative coordinate system for the specific
case of iterated public-goods games, which are the focus of this study.
(i) Mapping memory-m to memory-1: In order to simplify our analysis of long-memory strate-
gies we will conceive of a focal player using a memory-m strategy in an n-player game as a player who
instead uses a memory-1 strategy in an associated n×m-player game. That is, we will think of an n-player
game in which a focal player uses a memory-m strategy in terms of an equivalent n×m-player game, which
is composed of n “real” players along with m− 1 “shadow” players associated with each real player. The
shadow players play the same way that their associated real player did t rounds previously, for 2 ≤ t ≤ m.
The focal player’s memory-m strategy is thus identical to a memory-1 strategy in the n×m player game,
where the corresponding memory-1 strategy responds to a large set of “shadow” players whose actions in
the immediately previous round simply encode the actions taken by the n real players in the preceding
m rounds. This trick allows us to reduce the problem of studying long-memory strategies to the problem
of studying memory-1 strategies, albeit with a larger number of players in the game.
All that is required is to construct strategies for the shadow players so that the state of the system
across the preceding m rounds is correctly recreated at each round of the associated n×m-player game.
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This construction is straight forward. If the focal player played c in the last round, then we stipulate that
her first shadow player will play c in the next round (i.e. it will copy her last move). Similarly her second
shadow player will copy the last move of her first shadow player, and so on, up to her (m− 1)st shadow
player. The same goes for the shadow players of each of her n− 1 opponents. In this way, all the plays of
the last m rounds in the n-player game are encoded at each round in the associated n×m-player game.
Having transformed an arbitrary memory-m strategy in an n-player into an associated memory-1
strategy in an n×m-player game, we now describe a coordinate system for memory-1 strategies that al-
lows us to derive a simple relation among the equilibrium payoffs to all players. We define this coordinate
system for arbitrary games in the supporting information (section 3), and for the case of public-goods
games below.
(ii) Parameterizing strategies in public-goods games: Under a public-goods game, a player who
cooperates along with k of her opponents receives a net payoff Bk/n − C, whereas a player who defects
while k of her opponents cooperate receives a net payoff Bk/n. That is, the payoff received depends on
whether or not the focal player cooperated and on the number of her opponents that cooperated, but it
does not depend on the identity of her cooperating opponents. Likewise, if a player has memory of the
preceding m rounds of an iterated public-goods game, then her payoff across those rounds depends on
the total number of times she cooperated and the total number of times her opponents cooperated, but it
does not depend on the order in which different players cooperated nor on the identity of her cooperating
opponents. Therefore, rather than studying the full space of 2n×m probabilities for cooperation, we can
limit our analysis for iterated public-goods games to strategies that keep track of the total number of
times a focal player cooperated, and the number of times her opponents cooperated, within her memory
capacity. A focal player’s strategy can thus be expressed as ((n − 1)m + 1) × (m + 1) probabilities for
cooperation each round, plo,lp , where lo denotes the total of number of times the player’s opponents co-
operated in the preceding m rounds (which number can vary between 0 and (n− 1)m) and lp denotes the
total number of times the player herself cooperated in the preceding m rounds (which can vary between
0 and m).
Although the probabilities plo,lp are perhaps the most natural coordinates for describing a memory-m
strategy in an iterated n-player public-goods game, we have developed an alternative coordinate system,
defined in Figure 2, that simplifies the analysis of equilibrium payoffs and the evolutionary robustness of
strategies. The alternative system of ((n − 1)m + 1) × (m + 1) coordinates for a given player’s strategy
is described by parameters {χ, φ, κ,Λ0,0, . . . ,Λ(n−1)×m,m} defined in Figure 2. We impose the boundary
conditions Λ0,0 = Λ(n−1)×m,m = 0 along with one other linear relationship on the Λ terms (see supporting
information). Qualitatively, this coordinate system describes the probability of cooperation in a given
round, plo,lp , in terms of a weighted sum of five components: (1) The tendency to repeat past behavior;
(2) The baseline tendency to cooperate (κ); (3) The tendency to cooperate in proportion to the payoff
received by the focal player (χ); (4) The tendency to punish (i.e. defect) in proportion to the payoffs
received by her opponents (φ) and (5) The tendency to punish in response to the specific outcome of the
previous rounds (Λlo,lp).
The advantage of using this coordinate system is that it provides a simple relationship between the
long-term payoff to a focal player 0, S0, and the the long-term payoffs Si of each of her opponents i in
an iterated n-player public-goods game:
φ
n−1∑
i=1
Si
n− 1 − χS
0 − κ(φ− χ) +
(n−1)×m∑
l′o=0
m∑
l′p=0
Λˆl
′
o,l
′
pwl
′
o,l
′
p = 0. (1)
Here the term wl
′
o,l
′
p denotes the equilibrium rate at which the invading player cooperates l′p times and his
opponents cooperate l′o times over the preceding m rounds, and Λˆ
l′o,l′p denotes the contingent punishment
of the focal strategy from the point of view of a mutant (see supporting information for a derivation of 1).
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Figure 2: A co-ordinate system for describing strategies in public-goods games. We consider the space of
strategies of the form plo,lp , such that players cooperate with a probability that depends on the number
of times lo her opponents have cooperated and the number of times lp she has cooperated within her
memory. We define the strategy of a focal player by coordinates {χ, φ, κ,Λ0,0, . . .Λ(n−1)×m,m} as shown
in the figure. The components of this coordinate system have an intuitive interpretation: the probability
that a player cooperates depends on (1) her past tendency to cooperate, (2) a baseline tendency to
cooperate (κ), (3) a tendency to cooperate in proportion to her own payoff (χ), (4) a tendency to punish
(i.e. defect) in proportion to her opponents’ payoffs (φ) and (5) a contingent punishment that depends
on the specific outcome of the game over the prior m rounds (Λ(n−1)×m,m).
Λˆl
′
o,l
′
p is related in a simple way to the terms Λlo,lp , so that increasing Λlo,lp increases Λˆl
′
o,l
′
p (see supporting
information).
1.3 The effects of game size on robust cooperation
The relationship among payoffs summarized in 1 provides extensive insight into the outcome of iterated
public-goods games. Of particular interest are the prospects for cooperation as the game size n and
population size N grow. Public-goods games are well known examples of the collective action problem, in
which increasing the number of players in a game worsens the prospects for cooperation [33, 34]. Larger
populations, on the other hand, tend to make it easier to evolve robust cooperation, at least for two-player
games [8]. We will use 1 to explore the tradeoff between game size and population size, and the nature
of robust cooperative behaviors that can evolve in multi-player games.
1 allows us to characterize the ability of a cooperative strategy to resist invasion by any other strategy
in a population of size N [2,3,8,26]. We define a cooperative strategy as one which, when played by every
member of a population, assures that all players cooperate at equilibrium and thus receive the payoff for
mutual cooperation, B − C. This implies the necessary condition p(n−1)×m,m = 1, so that if all players
cooperated in the preceding m rounds, a player using a cooperative strategy is guaranteed to cooperate in
the next round. We call such strategies “cooperators” meaning that they produce sustained cooperation
when resident in a population. In the alternate coordinate system developed above a necessary condition
for sustained cooperation is κ = B − C.
Conversely, we also consider strategies that lead to collective inaction, meaning sustained defection.
Such strategies must have p0,0 = 0, which implies a necessary condition κ = 0 in the alternate coordinate
system. We call strategies satisfying this condition “defectors” meaning that they produce sustained
defection when resident in a population.
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A rare mutant i can invade a population of size N in which a cooperative strategy is resident only if
he receives a payoff Si that exceeds the payoff received by the resident cooperator. By considering bounds
on the payoffs received by players (see supporting information) we have derived necessary and sufficient
conditions for a cooperative strategy {χ, φ, κ, Λˆ0,1, . . . Λˆ(n−1)×m,m−1} to resist selective invasion by any
mutant strategy – that is, for a cooperative strategy to be evolutionary robust:
Cn,ms =
{
(χ, φ, κ, Λˆ0,0, . . . Λˆ(n−1)×m,m)
∣∣∣∣κ = B − C,
N − n
N − 1
(n−1)×m∑
lo=0
m∑
lp=0
Λˆlo,lpwlo,lp ≥
C
(
φ
N(n− 2) + 1
(N − 1)(n− 1) − χ
) (n−1)×m∑
lo=0
m∑
lp=0
lo + lp
(n− 1)×mw
lo,lp ,
N − n
N − 1
(n−1)×m∑
lo=0
m∑
lp=0
Λˆlo,lpwlo,lp ≥
(B − C)
(
φ
N(n− 2) + 1
(N − 1)(n− 1) − χ
) (n−1)×m∑
lo=0
m∑
lp=0
n×m− lo − lp
(n− 1)×m w
lo,lp
}
.
(2)
2 allows us to make a number of observations about the prospects and nature of robust coopera-
tion. First, all other things being equal, larger values of Λˆlo,lp , which correspond to stronger contingent
punishment, in which players successfully punish rare defection, make it easier for a strategy to satisfy
the requirements for robust cooperation. Second, positive values of χ, corresponding to more generous
strategies [8], in which players tend to share the benefits of mutual cooperation, also make it easier for
a strategy to satisfy the requirements for robust cooperation. Thus, complex strategies that punish rare
defection and are generous to other players tend to produce robust cooperative behavior in an evolving
population.
2 also shows that larger values of n, corresponding to games with more players, tend to make for
smaller volumes of robust cooperative strategies. This can be see on the left-hand side of the inequality
in 2, where increasing n attenuates the impact of contingent punishment on robustness. Likewise, this
can also been seen on the right-hand side of the iniquality in 2, where increasing n attenuates the impact
of generosity on robustness.
The effects of game size on the prospects for cooperation can be illustrated by considering two extreme
cases. When the entire population takes part in a single multi-player game, so that n = N , then 2 implies
that strategies can be robust only if χ ≥ φ. However, in order to produce a viable strategy χ ≤ φ is
required (Fig. 2); and so the only possible way to ensure robust cooperation in this extreme case is to
have χ = φ. The condition χ = φ gives a tit-for-tat-like strategy, and it results in unstable cooperative
behavior in the presence of noise [3]. And so, in the limit of games as large as the entire population size
the prospects for evolutionary robust cooperation are slim. However, in the contrasting case in which
the population size is much larger than the size of the game being played, that is N  n  1, then 2
shows that a positive volume of robust cooperative strategies always exists, given sufficient contingent
punishment Λlo,lp , even in very large games.
Understanding the expected rate of cooperation in multi-player games requires that we compare the
volume of robust cooperative strategies to the volume of robust defecting strategies. A rare mutant i can
invade a population in which a defecting strategy is resident only if he receives a payoff Si that exceeds
the payoff received by the resident defector. The resulting necessary and sufficient conditions for the
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robustness of defecting strategies are then:
Dn,ms =
{
(χ, φ, κ, Λˆ0,0, . . . Λˆ(n−1)×m,m)
∣∣∣∣κ = 0,
N − n
N − 1
(n−1)×m∑
lo=0
m∑
lp=0
Λˆlo,lpwlo,lp ≥
− (B − C)
(
φ
N(n− 2) + 1
(N − 1)(n− 1) − χ
) (n−1)×m∑
lo=0
m∑
lp=0
lo + lp
(n− 1)×mw
lo,lp ,
N − n
N − 1
(n−1)×m∑
lo=0
m∑
lp=0
Λˆlo,lpwlo,lp ≥
− C
(
φ
N(n− 2) + 1
(N − 1)(n− 1) − χ
) (n−1)×m∑
lo=0
m∑
lp=0
n×m− lo − lp
(n− 1)×m w
lo,lp
}
.
(3)
Once again, we see from 3 that larger values of Λˆlo,lp , resulting in stronger contingent punishment of rare
cooperators in a population of defectors, makes it easier for a defecting strategy to be robust. However, in
contrast to the case for cooperators, decreasing χ, which for defectors corresponds to more extortionate
behavior, such that players try to increase their own payoff at their opponents’ expense [1], makes a
defecting strategy more likely to satisfy the requirements for robustness. Finally, while larger values of n
attenuate the effect of contingent punishment on robustness, they also make more extortionate strategies
more robust; and the latter effect is always stronger, so that larger games permit a greater volume of
defecting strategies. In the extreme case of n = N all defecting strategies are robust. Overall, 3 implies
that increasing game size n tends to increase the volume of robust defectors, in contrast to its effect on
robust cooperators.
We confirmed our predictions for the effects of game size on the volume of robust cooperators and de-
fectors by analytical calculation of robust volumes, from Eqs. 2-3, and by comparison to direct simulation
for the invasibility of cooperators and defectors against a large range of mutant invaders (Figure 3a). As
game size increases the volume of robust cooperators decreases relative to the volume of robust defectors,
making cooperation harder to evolve.
There is a simple intuition for why larger games make cooperation less robust and defection more
robust: In public-goods games with more players, the marginal change in payoff to a player who switches
from cooperation to defection is C − B/n, and so the incentive to defect grows as the size of the game
grows. This of course is the group size paradox, and it is a well known phenomenon for any collective
action problem [33]. In the limiting case n = N the only hope for robust cooperation is tit-for-tat-like
strategies, that are capable of both sustained cooperation and sustained defection, depending on their
opponent’s behavior.
In general, both cooperators and defectors have positive volumes of robust strategies, provided n < N .
As such, both cooperation and defection can evolve. Although these robust strategies cannot be selectively
invaded by any other strategy when resident in a population, they can be neutrally replaced by a non-
robust strategy of the same type, which can in turn be selectively invaded. As a result, there is a constant
turnover between cooperation and defection over the course of evolution, with the relative time spent at
cooperation versus defection determined by their relative volumes of robust strategies [3, 26].
Our results show that the problem of collective action is alleviated by sufficiently large population
sizes. That is, for an arbitrarily large game size n we can always find yet larger population sizes N such
that robust cooperative strategies are guaranteed to exist. Moreover, increasing the population size N
leads to increasing volumes of robust cooperative strategies and decreasing volumes of robust defecting
strategies (Figure S1).
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Figure 3: The impact of game size and memory capacity on cooperation. We calculated the relative
volumes of robust cooperation – that is, the absolute volume of robust cooperative strategies divided
by the total volume of robust cooperators and defectors – and compared this to the relative volume of
defectors (solid lines) using Eqs. 2-3. We also verified these analytic results by randomly drawing 106
strategies and determining their success at resisting invasion from 105 random mutants (points). We
calculated player’s payoffs by simulating 2 × 103 rounds of a public-goods game. We then plotted the
relative volumes of robust cooperators and robust defectors as a function of game size n (with fixed
memory m = 1, left) and as a function of memory capacity m (with fixed game size n = 2, right).
Increasing game size increases the relative volume of robust defection; while increasing memory length
increases the relative volume of robust cooperation. In all calculations and simulations we used cost C = 1
and benefit B as indicated in the figure.
1.4 The effects of memory on robust cooperation
We have not yet said anything about the impact of memory capacity on the prospects for cooperation.
Indeed, the robustness conditions Eqs. 2-3 do not depend explicitly on memory length m, as they do on
game size n and on population size N . However, memory does have an important impact on the efficacy
of contingent punishment, Λˆ, on the left-hand sides of the inequalities in 2 and Eq. 3. Figure 3 illustrates
the impact of increasing memory m on the volume of robust cooperative and robust defecting strategies.
Here we see the opposite pattern to the effect for game size: as memory increases, there is a larger volume
of robust cooperation relative to robust defection.
We can develop an intuitive understanding for the effect of memory on sustained cooperation by
considering its role in producing effective punishment. A longer memory enables a player to punish
opponents who seek to gain an advantage through rare deviations from the social norm: that is, rare
defectors in a population of cooperators or rare cooperators in a population of defectors. However, using
a long memory to punish rare defectors is a more effective way to enforce cooperation than punishing
rare cooperators is to enforce defection (since in the latter case the default behavior is to defect anyway,
and so increasing the amount of “punishment” has little overall effect on payoff). And so as memory
increases, cooperators become more robust relative to defectors, as 2-3 and Figure 3 show.
The change in the efficacy of punishment for rare deviants from the social norm as memory capacity
increases is illustrated in Figure S2, where we calculate the average Λˆlo,lp for randomly-drawn cooperative
or defecting strategies. We see that as memory capacity increases, a randomly drawn cooperator tends to
engage in more effective punishment (larger values of Λˆlo,lo) whereas a randomly drawn defector tends to
engage in less effective punishment (smaller values of Λˆlo,lo). This trend explains why increasing memory
capacity increases the volume of robust cooperators relative to defectors.
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1.5 Evolution of memory
Our results on the relationship between memory capacity and the robustness of cooperation raise a number
of interesting questions. In particular, memory of the type we have considered does not seem to convey
a direct advantage to cooperation (or defection), because a robust cooperative (or defecting) strategy
is robust against all possible invaders, regardless of their memory capacity. However increased memory
can nonetheless make robust cooperation easier to evolve, because it allows for more effective contingent
punishment. This tends to have a stronger impact when games are small because, as described in Eqs.
2-3, the impact of contingent punishment on robustness is attenuated by a factor N−n, and thus the effect
of longer memory on the contributions of Λˆ terms to robust cooperation is smaller in larger games. And
so, at least when the number of players is relatively small, we might expect long memories to facilitate
the evolution of cooperation in populations.
What our analysis has not yet addressed is whether memory capacity itself can adapt, and what
its co-evolution with strategies in a population will imply for the longterm prospects of cooperation.
To address this question we undertook evolutionary simulations, allowing heritable mutations both to a
player’s strategy and also to her memory capacity. These simulations, illustrated in Figure 4, confirm
that (i) longer memories do indeed evolve and (ii) this leads to an increase in the amount of cooperation
in a population (Figure 4). In a two-player game, if memory has no cost, memory tends to increase over
time, which in turn drives an increase in the frequency of cooperators and a decline in defectors. This
is accompanied by a large overall increase in the population mean fitness. By contrast, when the game
size is large, n = N , there is little evolutionary change in memory capacity and defection continues to be
more frequent than cooperation even as strategies and memory co-evolve. When memory comes at a cost
(Figure S3), an intermediate level of memory evolves for small n, and there is a correspondingly weaker
increase in the degree of cooperation.
How are we to understand why memory evolves at all in these co-evolutionary simulations? The change
in memory capacity is puzzling, at first glance, because a longer memory conveys no direct advantage
against a resident robust strategy – since robustness implies uninvadability by any opponent, regardless
of the opponent’s memory capacity. The key to understanding this co-evolutionary pattern is to note that
longer memories are, on average, better at invading non-robust strategies, due to their greater capacity
for contingent punishment (Figure S3). Thus, when games are sufficiently small, the neutral drift that
leads to turnover between cooperation and defection [3, 26] also provides opportunity for longer-memory
strategies to invade and fix.
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Figure 4: Co-evolution of strategies and memory capacity. We simulated populations playing the iter-
ated n-player public-goods game, proposing mutant strategies until reaching equilibrium, and then also
proposing mutations to a player’s memory capacity m, each at rate µ/10. In these simulations all players
initially have memory m = 1, with payoff parameters C = 1 and B = 1.2. Mutations to strategies
were drawn uniformly from the full space of memory-m strategies. Mutations perturbing the memory m
caused it to increase or decrease by 1, with a lower bound of m = 1. Evolution was modeled according
to a copying process under weak mutation [3] in a population of size N = 10 individuals. (a) When
the game size is small, n = 2, defecting strategies are initially dominant in the population, but they are
quickly replaced by cooperators as memory capacity evolves to higher values. (b) When game size is large,
n = N = 10, defecting strategies initially dominate the population and they remain dominant as memory
evolves. In both (a) and (b) the overall frequency of cooperators and defectors decline as the dimension
of strategy space increases, in line with the decline in the overall volume of robust strategies (Figure S4).
(c) When the game size is small memory evolves rapidly to larger values, reflecting the greater success of
longer-memory strategies at invading (Figure S3), and driving the increase in cooperative as compared to
defecting strategies. (d) When the game size is large memory does not evolve to large values, reaching
only m = 2 across 50,000 generations, and reflecting the decline in long-memory strategies’ success as
invaders in larger games. (e) As cooperation increases so does the average payoff of the population, by a
factor of 5-10 fold. (f) The lack of increase in cooperation results in a much more modest (although still
appreciable) increase in average payoff for the population as defectors become less frequent.11
2 Discussion
We have constructed a coordinate system that enables us to completely characterize the evolutionary
robustness of arbitrary strategies in iterated multi-player public-goods games. This allows us to quantify
the contrasting impacts of the number of players who engage in a game, and the memory capacity of
those players, on the evolution of cooperative behavior and collective action. In particular we have shown
that while increasing the number of players in a game makes both cooperation and longer memories
harder to evolve, in small games, memory capacity tends to increase over time and drives the evolution
of cooperative behavior.
To understand the evolution of social behavior it is not sufficient to simply determine whether partic-
ular types of strategies exist or not. Indeed, for repeated games, strategies that enforce any given social
norm are guaranteed to exist by the famous Folk Theorems [35]. The more incisive question, from an
evolutionary viewpoint, is how often strategies of different types arise via random mutation, how often
they reach fixation, and how long they remain fixed in the face of mutant invaders and other evolutionary
forces such as neutral genetic drift. To address these questions we have analyzed the evolutionary robust-
ness of strategies that result in sustained cooperation. We have shown that a strategy is more likely to
be evolutionary robust if it can successfully punish defectors. We have shown that players with longer
memories have access to a greater volume of such evolutionary robust strategies, and that, as a result,
over the course of evolution populations that evolve longer memories are more likely to evolve cooperative
behaviors. Memory of the type we have considered does not result in better strategies per se, but in a
greater quantity of robust cooperative strategies.
In contrast to memory capacity, larger games favor defecting strategies over cooperating strategies,
because larger games reduce the marginal cost to a player of switching from cooperation to defection, and
make it harder for even long-memory players to effectively punish defectors. Thus we find in evolutionary
simulations that only in small games do both long-memory strategies and cooperation tend to evolve and
dominate. It is important to emphasize that these effects are driven by changes in the volume of robust
cooperative strategies.
A complex balance between behavior, memory, game size and environment can lead to wide variation
in evolutionary outcomes in the presence of social interactions. Understanding this balance is vital if we
are to understand and interpret the role of cooperative behavior in evolution. Despite the complexity
of the problem, and the very general n-player memory-m setting we have analyzed, we have arrived at
a few simple qualitative predictions, which may admit to testing not only in the social interactions of
natural populations [12] but also through experiments with human players [36, 37]. Of course, the type
of memory discussed here is only a small part of the story. We have ignored the possibility of other
kinds of memory, which allow players to “tag” one another [38, 39] after the completion of a game. We
have ignored the role of spatial structure, of demographic structure, and of dispersal [5]. We have failed
to specify the underlying mechanisms by which public-goods and players’ decisions are produced and
executed. Accounting for all of these additional factors is an important challenge as researchers seek to
elucidate the emergence of collective action in evolving populations and beyond.
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3 Overview of Supporting Information
In this supplement we detail our analysis of iterated n-player games in which players have two choices
in each round and can remember the outcomes of the previous m rounds. We identify the strategies
that are able to resist selective invasion by any other strategy in an evolving population of players. Such
strategies are called “evolutionary robust”, as defined formally below. An iterated n-player game consists
of an infinite series of “rounds” in each of which each player chooses to either “cooperate” (c) or “defect”
(d). A memory-m strategy stipulates that the probability of cooperation in the current round depends
on the outcomes of the preceding m rounds. The full space of memory-m strategies in such an n-player
game thus has dimension 2n×m. To identify strategies that are evolutionary robust across such a large
space we first introduce a convenient coordinate transform for the space of memory-m strategies, which
generalizes that introduced to study memory-1 strategies in iterated 2-player games [1–3]. This coordinate
transformation enables us to identify sets of memory-m strategies that are robust to invasion by any other
strategy in an evolving population. We apply this method to analyse evolutionary robustness in various
n-player iterated public goods game.
3.1 Iterated n-player games
We consider an iterated game with an infinite number of successive rounds between a player, X0 and
her opponents X1, X2. . .Xn−1. We study games for which, in each round, each player has two choices,
denoted cooperate (c) and defect (d). The payoffs in a given round to the focal player X0 is given by
Rc,l−1, if she cooperates along with l− 1 of her opponents, and it is given by Rd,l if she defects while l of
her opponents cooperate.
We will focus on public goods-type games, for which by definition in each round
• Rd,l > Rc,l−1 so that, given l players cooperating in total, those who defected receive a higher payoff
than those who cooperated
• Rc,l ≥ Rc,l−1 and Rd,l ≥ Rd,l−1 so that, typically, the more of her opponents cooperate, the higher
the payoff a cooperative focal player receives.
We will focus in particular on the most typical type of public goods game, for which Rc,l−1 = B ln − C
and Rd,l = B
l
n , where B > C.
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3.2 Memory-m strategies
A memory-m strategy takes account of the outcomes of the preceding m rounds of play among all players.
As such in any given round there are n ×m plays taken into account, and the strategy space therefore
has dimension 2n×m – that is, a player’s strategy consists of 2n×m probabilities for cooperation. First we
develop notation to describe the probability that a focal player will cooperate in a focal round, given the
plays made by all n players over the preceding m rounds. We denote the sequence of plays of the ith
player over the preceding m rounds σi, which has elements σ
i
k, denoting the play of player i, k steps in
the past, where i = 0 . . . n − 1 and k = 1 . . .m. Thus σik = c if player i cooperated and σik = d if she
defected k steps in the past. We then write the probability for cooperation for a particular history of play
in its most general form as pσ0,σ1,σ2, . . . ,σn−1 ∈ [0, 1].
In order to determine the robustness of such strategies, it will be convenient to introduce the operator
θ which returns
θ
(
σik
)
=
{
1 if σki = c
0 if σki = d
where for simplicity we will often write θik in place of θ
(
σik
)
for the play of the ith player k steps back
in time. The number of times player i cooperated within memory is thus
∑m
k=1 θ
i
k and the number of
players who cooperated in the immediately preceding round is
∑n−1
i=0 θ
i
1.
3.3 Equilibrium payoffs in Iterated Games
The longterm scores received by n memory-m players in an infinitely iterated game are calculated from
the equilibrium rates of the different plays. This can be determined from the stationary distribution a
Markov chain on 2n×m states, which correspond to the history of plays across the preceding m rounds.
In order to do this we write the equilibrium rate of a particular history of plays as vσ0,σ1,σ2, . . . ,σn−1 .
The essential trick we use to analyze equillibrium payoffs in multi-player games among players with
long-memory strategies is to reduce the problem to an equivalent problem involving more players each
using only memory-1 strategies. The advantage of the memory-1 setting is that it will allow us to express
equillibrium payoffs in the framework of determinants developed by Press & Dyson and others ??. In
particular, given a game among n players who memory-m strategies we construct an equivalent n ×m-
player game in which players use only memory-1 strategies. Of these n×m players, n are “real” players,
and they each use a memory-1 strategy that corresponds precisely to a memory-m strategy in the original
long-memory game, as described above. In order to allow the “real” memory-1 players to effectively react
to the entire history of plays across m prior rounds we construct m − 1 “shadow” players for each real
player, who encode the information of earlier rounds. At each round, the shadow player with index k > 1
deterministically executes the play of its associated real player, k rounds in the past.
Given an n-player game among memory-m strategies, we encode the equivalent n ×m-player game
among memory-1 strategies by writing pi,k as the vector of all 2n×m probabilities for cooperation for the
ith player, k steps in the past. If we order the players such that they are indexed from j = 1 . . . n ×m
then the index of player i, k is given by j = i ×m + k. In this labelling system, pi,1 is the strategy of
the ith real player, and v is the corresponding stationary vector of equilibrium rates of play. Finally we
must encode the “strategy vector” of the shadow players, which encode how a player updates her memory
each round. This is simple to do. We write pi,k as the “strategy” vector which updates the memory of
player i, k steps in the past (see Figure. S1 for illustration). This vector has entry 1 if θik−1 = 1 and 0 if
θik−1 = 0. Thus the real strategy of player i consists of probabilities p
i,1 ∈ [0, 1]n×m, whereas a shadow
strategy, for which k > 1, consists of deterministic quantities pi,k ∈ {0, 1}n×m.
The equilibrium score of player X0 against players X1, X2. . .Xn−1 is calculated according to a particular
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form of determinant D defined below and written as:
S01 =
v ·R01
v · I =
D
(
p0,1,p0,2. . .p0,m,p1,1,p1,2. . .p1,m. . .pn−1,1,pn−1,2. . .pn−1,m,R0,1
)
D (p0,1,p0,2. . .p0,m,p1,1,p1,2. . .p1,m. . .pn−1,1,pn−1,2. . .pn−1,m, I)
(4)
Note that in this expression have used the notation of the associated game with n×m, memory-1 players,
n of which correspond to the players in the original n-player, memory-m game. In this equation I denotes
the identity vector of size 2n×m, for which all elements are 1, and R0,1 denotes the payoff vector of player
X0. The payoff to player 0 in a given round depends only on her own play and the plays of the n other
players in that round. In general, the payoffs received by player i, in the round that occurred k steps
previously is determined from the payoff vector Ri,k, which has 2n×m elements Ri,kσ0,σ1,σ2, . . . ,σn−1 can
be written as
Ri,kσ0,σ1,σ2, . . . ,σn−1 =
Rc,∑n−1j=0 θjk if θ
i
k = 1
R
d,
∑n−1
j=0 θ
j
k
if θik = 0
(5)
Where for the standard public goods game we can write R
c,
∑n−1
j=0 θ
j
k
= bn
∑n−1
j=0 θ
j
k − cθik and Rd,∑n−1j=0 θjk =
b
n
∑n−1
j=0 θ
j
k.
In general, the determinant D
(
p0,1,p0,2. . .p0,m,p1,1,p1,2. . .p1,m. . .pn−1,1,pn−1,2. . .pn−1,m, f
)
arises
from a generalization of the results of Press & Dyson, [1] for two-player games, and of [4, 5] for multi-
player games, and gives the dot product between the stationary vector v and an arbitrary vector f which
has elements fσ0,σ1,σ2, . . . ,σn−1 . In the example of a three player game with memory-1 strategies between
players X0, X1 and X2 with strategies p, q and r, the determinant is given by
D(px,qy, rz, f) =
det

−1 + pc,c,cqc,c,crc,c,c −1 + pc,c,cqc,c,c −1 + pc,c,crc,c,c −1 + pc,c,c −1 + qc,c,crc,c,c −1 + qc,c,c −1 + rc,c,c fc,c,c
pc,c,dqc,c,drd,c,c −1 + pc,c,dqc,c,d pc,c,drd,c,c −1 + pc,c,d qc,c,drd,c,c −1 + qc,c,d rd,c,c fc,c,d
pc,d,cqd,c,crc,d,c pc,d,cqd,c,c −1 + pc,d,crc,d,c −1 + pc,d,c qd,c,crc,d,c qd,c,c −1 + rc,d,c fc,d,c
pc,d,dqd,c,drd,d,c pc,d,dqd,c,d pc,d,drd,d,c −1 + pc,d,d qd,c,drd,d,c qd,c,d rd,d,c fc,d,d
pd,c,cqc,d,crc,c,d pd,c,cqc,d,c pd,c,crc,c,d pd,c,c −1 + qc,d,crc,c,d −1 + qc,d,c −1 + rc,c,d fd,c,c
pd,c,dqc,d,drd,c,d pd,c,dqc,d,d pd,c,drd,c,d pd,c,d qc,d,drd,c,d −1 + qc,d,d rd,c,d fd,c,d
pd,d,cqd,d,crc,d,d pd,d,cqd,d,c pd,d,crc,d,d pd,d,c qd,d,crc,d,d qd,d,c −1 + rc,d,d fd,d,c
pd,d,dqd,d,drd,d,d pc,d,dqc,d,d pc,d,drc,d,d pc,d,d qc,d,drc,d,d qc,d,d rc,d,d fd,d,d

.
(6)
Eq. 1 can be used to calculate the scores received by n memory-1 players in a given game. However, there
are certain cases in which the Markov chain describing the iterated game has multiple absorbing states,
and the denominator of Eq.1 goes to zero. The scores in these cases can be calculated by assuming that
players execute their strategy with some small “error rate”  [6], so that the probability of cooperation is
at most 1−  and at least . Assuming this, and taking the limit  → 0 then gives the player’s scores in
the cases where multiple absorbing states exist.
4 Evolution in a population of players
We study the evolution of memory-m strategies in a population of N individuals playing an iterated
n-player game, with N ≥ n. In each generation, all subsets of n players in the population engage in
the iterated game, and each player in the population receives a total score across all the
(
N−1
n−1
)
games
in which she participates. We assume that the population is well-mixed, so that the makeup of different
strategies these games depends upon the frequencies of strategies in the population. We focus on evolution
under weak-mutation, in which a strategy X is resident in the population; a single mutant strategy Y
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arises through mutation; and Y is subsequently either lost or goes to fixation in the population, before
another mutant arises. We always use X to denote the resident, and Y the mutant, strategy. Under this
weak-mutation assumption there are at most two strategy types present in the population at any time.
We use the notation SXa to denote the payoff to strategy X in a single iterated game involving a
players of type Y and n−a players of type X. We use the notation SYa to denote the payoff to strategy Y
in a single iterated game involving a players of type Y and n−a players of type X. When the population
as a whole contains b players of type Y and N − b players of type X, then, the total score to a player of
type X, denoted TX(b), is given by
TX(b) =
(N − n)!(n− 1)!
(N − 1)!
min[b,n−1]∑
a=0
(N − 1− b)!
(N − b− (n− a))!(n− 1− a)!
b!
a!(b− a)!S
X
a
where the sum over a denotes the different number of opponents of type Y that X may face in the
n-player games she plays in a single generation. The total score to a mutant Y in such a population,
denoted T Y (b), can be calculated in the same way.
We model evolution according to the copying process [7], in which pairs of players are drawn at
random from the population, and the first player switches her strategy to that of the second player with
a probability that depends on the difference between their total scores. Thus a player using a strategy X
switches to Y with probability
fX→Y =
1
1 + exp [s (TX(a)− T Y (a))]
where s is a parameter denoting the strength of selection.
The “strong-selection” regime of this process occurs when Ns  1. Under this regime selection is
sufficiently strong that an invading mutant is extremely unlikely to reach high frequency in the populaiton,
unless it has a selecive advantage (or is neutral) against the resident strategy in the population. Thus
under strong selection, resident strategies that can resist invasion by all other mutants are evolutionary
robust. Alternatively, the “weak-selection” limit arises when Ns  1 in which case even deleterious
strategies may reach high frequency through genetic drift. We focus on the regime of strong selection in
our analysis below.
4.1 Evolutionary robustness
The concept of evolutionary robustness [8] is similar to the notion of evolutionary stability [9, 10], but
more useful for studying evolution in large strategy spaces, in which an ESS strategy typically does not
exist [3, 8]. In general, a strategy is defined to be evolutionary robust if, when resident in a population,
there is no mutant that is favored to spread by natural selection when rare [8].
More precisely, under strong selection a resident strategy X is evolutionary robust iff T Y (1) ≤ TX(1)
for all strategies Y . This condition for evolutionary robustness under strong selection is identical to that
of a Nash equilibrium in the limit N →∞.
5 Coordinate Transform
In two-player games, the work of Press & Dyson [1] and Akin [2] allows us to identify a coordinate
transform for the full space of memory-1 strategies. This coordinate transformation permits a simple
closed-form expression relating the scores of two players in a game, which has enabled us to identify all
evolutionary robust memory-1 strategies, under both strong and weak selection [3,8]. Here we extend this
line of analysis to multi-player games with memory-m strategies. We begin by identifying an analogous
coordinate transform for the 2n×m-dimensional space of memory-m strategies in an n-player game.
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To define the desired co-ordinate transform we must identify 2n×m vectors that form a basis in Rn×m
and that allow us to write down a simple, closed-form relationship between the players’ scores in a given
game.
These vectors consist firstly of the n×m+ 1 vectors Rik for each player’s payoff in the kth preceding
round, along with the identify vector I, with entry 1 in all positions. The second set of vectors in the
coordinate transform consists of the n×m−1 vectors denoted Ll , where Ll is has entry 1 when l players
cooperated in the previous m rounds and entry 0 otherwise, regardless of the focal player’s play in the
previous round. Note that this excludes the case where all players cooperated and the case where no
players cooperated, which are accounted for by the identity vector.
The final 2n×m−2n×m vectors required for the coordinate transform account for the degeneracy that
arises due to the number of ways in which l players can cooperate in the preceding m rounds. Given l, if
the focal player cooperates lp times over m rounds, and her opponents therefore cooperate lo = l−lp times,
she will receive the same total payoff over those m rounds in a standard public goods game, regardless of
which players cooperated or when. In the most general case a player may nonetheless distinguish between
the play of each player (including herself) in each of the preceding m rounds.
We already have 2n×m vectors, as described above. The simplest way to account for the remaining
dimensions (required for players to distinguish between all possible outcomes) is simply to add
2
n×m−1∑
l=1
(
(n×m− 1)!
k!(n×m− l − 1)! − 1
)
= 2n×m − 2n×m
vectors, denoted G
lo,lp
σ0,σ1,σ2, . . . ,σn−1 , which have entry 1 for a single set of plays (σ0,σ1,σ2, . . . ,σn−1),
for which
∑n−1
i=1
∑m
k=1 θ
i
k = lo is the total number of times all players have cooperated in the last m rounds
and
∑m
k=1 θ
0
k = lp is the number of times the focal player has cooperated in the last m rounds. Note that
we have written these vectors in terms of lp and lo in order to aid later analysis.
We adopt the convention that we do not add a vector G
lo,lp
σ0,σ1,σ2, . . . ,σn−1 for the set of opponent
plays which is ordered cccc. . .dddd across the ordered history of all players, and the set focal player plays
ordered either cccc. . .dddd or dccc. . .dddd. That is, the play for which the first lo terms of the sum∑n−1
i=1
∑m
k=1 θ
i
k are 1, and either θ
1
0 = 1 and
∑lp
k=1 θ
i
k = lp or else θ
1
0 = 0 and
∑lp+1
k=1 θ
i
k = lp.
In summary, the 2n×m vectors for the coordinate transform consist of
• n×m vectors R for the player’s payoffs, and the vector I.
• n×m− 1 vectors Ll with entry 1 when l players cooperated in the previous round.
• 2n×m − 2n ×m vectors G with a single entry 1, to account for the degeneracy which arises when
different combinations of opponents cooperate.
Although this is a somewhat complex transformation, we shall see the utility of working this way in what
follows.
For clarity’s sake we can write down this coordinate system explicitly, first for the case of n = 3 players
with memory-1. The new coordinate system is
{
R01,R
1
1,R
2
1, I,L
1,L2,G1,1c,d,c,G
1,0
d,d,c
}
and we have
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det

Rc,2 Rc,2 Rc,2 1 0 0 0 0
Rc,1 Rc,1 Rd,2 1 1 0 0 0
Rc,1 Rd,2 Rc,1 1 1 0 1 0
Rc,0 Rd,1 Rd,1 1 0 1 0 0
Rd,2 Rc,1 Rc,1 1 1 0 0 0
Rd,1 Rc,0 Rd,1 1 0 1 0 0
Rd,1 Rd,1 Rc,0 1 0 1 0 1
Rd,0 Rd,0 Rd,0 1 0 0 0 0

= −3(Rc,2 −Rd,0)(Rd,1 −Rc,0)(Rd,2 −Rc,1) (7)
which is therefore a basis R8. Similarly, for the case of n = 2 players with with memory-m the new coor-
dinate system is
{
R01,R
1
1,R
0
2,R
1
2, I,L
1,L2,L3,G1,0dd,cd,G
1,0
dd,dc,G
2,0
dd,cc,G
1,1
dc,dc,G
1,1
cd,cd,G
1,1
cd,dc,G
1,2
cc,dc,G
2,1
cd,cc
}
and we have
det

Rc,2 Rc,2 Rc,2 Rc,2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rc,2 Rc,1 Rc,2 Rd,1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rc,2 Rd,1 Rc,2 Rc,1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Rc,2 Rd,0 Rc,2 Rd,0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Rc,1 Rc,2 Rd,1 Rc,2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Rc,1 Rc,1 Rd,1 Rd,1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rc,1 Rd,1 Rd,1 Rc,1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Rc,1 Rd,0 Rd,1 Rd,0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rd,1 Rc,2 Rc,1 Rc,2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rd,1 Rc,1 Rc,1 Rd,1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rd,1 Rd,1 Rc,1 Rc,1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Rd,1 Rd,0 Rc,1 Rd,0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rd,0 Rc,2 Rd,0 Rc,2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Rd,0 Rc,1 Rd,0 Rd,1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rd,0 Rd,1 Rd,0 Rc,1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rd,0 Rd,0 Rd,0 Rd,0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

= −4(Rc,2 −Rd,0)2(Rd,1 −Rc,1)2
(8)
which is therefore a basis R16.
Using the results of Press & Dyson, generalised to multi-player games [1,4,5], the strategy of the focal
player in this coordinate new system, which for convenience we assign index i = 0, is given by a vector of
the form:
p0,1 − θ01 =
n−1∑
i=0
m∑
k=1
αikR
i
k + αn1 +
(n−1)×m∑
lo=0
m∑
lp=0
λlo+lpLlo+lp + ∑
σ∈Ho,p
γ
lo,lp
σ G
lo,lp
σ
 . (9)
where we define Ho,p =
{
(σ0, . . . , σn)|
∑m
k=1 θ
0
k = lp,
∑n−1
i=1
∑n−1
k=1 θ
i
k = lo
}
is the set of combinations of
plays by n players across the last m rounds such that player 0 (the focal player) cooperated lp times
and her oppoennts cooperated a total lo times. Note that we set λ = γ = 0 when lo = lp = 0 and
lo + lp = n×m. The vector θ01 has the corresponding elements θ01 for the play of the focal player in the
preceding round (i.e 1 if she cooperated and 0 if she defected), and we have written σ = (σ0, . . . , σn).
From Eq.1 the scores of the players are then related by the expression
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n−1∑
i=0
m∑
k=1
αikS
i + αn1 +
(n−1)×m∑
lo=0
m∑
lp=0
λlo+lpvlo,lp + ∑
σ∈Ho,p
γ
lo,lp
σ v
lo,lp
σ
 = 0. (10)
where Si denotes the equilibrium score of player i in the current game, vlo+lp denotes the rate at which
lo + lp players cooperate and v
lo,lp
σ is the rate at which the focal player cooperates lp times, along with lo
of her opponents, with the sequence of plays following the ordering σ = (σ0,σ1,σ2, . . . ,σn−1). Note
that the equilibrium score of player i is independent of k in Eq. 7.
We now additionally define the parameters χ0k = −α0k; φi×m+k = αik; and κ
(∑m
k=1
(
χ0k −
∑n
i=1 φi×m+k
))
=
αn. In this new parameterization we can re-write the relationship among the players’ scores as:
m∑
k=1
(
n−1∑
i=1
φi×m+k(Si − κ)− χ0k(S0 − κ)
)
+
(n−1)×m∑
lo=0
m∑
lp=0
λlo+lpvlo,lp + ∑
σ∈Ho,p
γ
lo,lp
σ v
lo,lp
σ
 = 0 (11)
Eq.8 gives the most general form for the relationship between player’s scores in an n-player game with
memory-m. Henceforth we will restrict our analysis restricted to a focal strategy in which a memory-m
player does not distinguish between her opponents, and does not pay attention to the order of cooperation
events. As such we consider a focal player who keeps track of two quantities: (i) the total number of
times her opponents cooperated in the last m rounds and (ii) the total number of times she cooperated
in the last m rounds.
5.1 Strategies that track cooperation frequency
If a focal player tracks only the number of times she cooperated in the last m rounds, and the total
number of times her opponent cooperated in the last m rounds, then her memory-m strategy consists of
((n− 1)m+ 1)× (m+ 1), since her (n− 1) opponents can cooperate anywhere between 0 and (n− 1)m
times in m rounds, and she can cooperate anywhere between 0 and m times, to give a strategy consisting
of ((n− 1)m+ 1)× (m+ 1) probabilities for cooperation. We will henceforth explicitly adopt a standard
public goods payoff structure, with Rc,l = B
l
n − C and Rd,l = B ln
Eq. 6 encodes a strategy with 2n×m probabilities for cooperation, many of which are redundant in our
reduced strategy space. Let the focal player cooperate lp times and her opponents cooperate lo times in
m rounds.
Starting from Eq. 8 are now able to make two observations:
(i) If the focal player does not distinguish between opponents, or the order in which they cooperate, then
her payoff, and the equilibrium rate of play vlo,lp are the same for all ((n − 1) ×m)! ×m! orderings of
opponents and plays. Summing over all possible orderings of opponents and dividing by ((n−1)×m)!×m!
results in the equilibrium scores being related by
φ
n−1∑
j=1
Sj
n− 1 −
m∑
k=1
χ0k(S
0 − κ)− κφ+
(n−1)×m∑
lo=0
m∑
lp=0
[
λlo+lp + γ
lo,lp
]
vlo,lp = 0 (12)
where we have set φ =
∑n−1
i=1
∑m
k=1 φi×m+k and
lp!(m−lp)!
m!
lo!((n−1)×m−lo)!
((n−1)×m)!
∑
σ∈Ho,p γ
lo,lp
σ = γ
lo,lp , and the γ
terms result from noting that, when summing over all orderings of opponents and events, a given term
γlo,lp is multiplied by each rate of play v
lo,lp
σ a total
m!
lp!(m− lp)!
((n− 1)×m)!
lo!((n− 1)×m− lo)!
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(ii) If we then sum over all m!lp!(m−lp)!
((n−1)×m)!
lo!((n−1)×m−lo)! degenerate probabilities for a given lo and lp we
then arrive at
− lp
m
+ plo,lp = − lo
(n− 1)×mCφ+B
lo + lp
n×m
(
φ−
m∑
k=1
χ0k
)
+
m∑
k=1
χ0kC
lp
m
−
(
φ−
m∑
k=1
χ0k
)
κ+λlo+lp + γ
lo,lp .
as the expression for the probability of cooperation given that the focal player cooperated lp times and
her opponents lo times in the last m rounds, assuming she only tracks cooperation frequency.
5.2 Boundary conditions
If we recall our convention that the equation lacking a γ is that which is ordered with cccc.....dddd etc we
then have the following boundary conditions
−1 + plo,m = −C
lo∑
i=1
φi +B
lo + lp
n×m
(
lo∑
i=1
φi −
m∑
k=1
χ0k
)
+
m∑
k=1
χ0kC −
(
lo∑
i=1
φi −
m∑
k=1
χ0k
)
κ+ λlo+m
and
−1 + p0,lp = B lp
n×m
(
lo∑
i=1
φi −
m∑
k=1
χ0k
)
+
lp∑
k=1
χ0kC −
(
lo∑
i=1
φi −
m∑
k=1
χ0k
)
κ+ λlp
Similarly the term with dccc.....dddd lacks a γ terms so that
plo,m−1 = −C
lo∑
i=1
φi +B
lo + lp
n×m
(
lo∑
i=1
φi −
m∑
k=1
χ0k
)
+
m∑
k=2
χ0kC −
(
lo∑
i=1
φi −
m∑
k=1
χ0k
)
κ+ λlo+m−1
and
p0,lp = B
lp
n×m
(
lo∑
i=1
φi −
m∑
k=1
χ0k
)
φ+
lp+1∑
k=2
χ0kC −
(
lo∑
i=1
φi −
m∑
k=1
χ0k
)
κ+ λlp
First, combining the two expressions for p0,lp gives
φCχ0lp+1 = 1 + φCχ
0
1
and since this must hold for all lp we have χ
0
lp+1
= χ0m is constant, and
φ =
1
C(χ0m − χ01)
(13)
Substituting these into the general expression for p0,lp we find
γ0,lp = 0
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Second, combining the expressions for plo,m and plo,m−1 gives
φγlo,m =
m− 1
m
+ φC
m− 1
m
(χ01 − χ0m) + φγlo,m−1
Substituting for φ we then find
γlo,m = γlo,m−1
Finally, since γ(n−1)×,m = 0 by definition this also implies
γ(n−1)×m,m−1 = 0
We therefore have ((n − 1) ×m + 1)(m + 1) − (n ×m + 2) parameters γlo,lp , plus n ×m − 1 parameter
λlo,lp , plus 3 parameters χ, φ and κ to give a total ((n− 1)×m+ 1)(m+ 1) parameters as required. We
can use these boundary conditions for γ to construct the inverse coordinate transform. We arrive at the
three simultaneous equations which can be solved for for κ, χ and φ:∑(n−1)×m−1
i=1
(
pi,m − pi,m−1)− (p(n−1)×m,m−1 − p0,m) = (n− 1)− C(n− 1)χ− Cφ
p0,0 = κ(φ− χ)
p(n−1)×m,m = 1 + κ(φ− χ)− (B − C)(φ− χ)
with the remaining terms Λlo,lp being determined by these three parameters plus plo,lp . Finally, we set
χ = χ01 + (m− 1)χ0m (14)
and
Λlo,lp = λlo+lp + γ
lo,lp (15)
to define a coordinate system characterized by a vector of ((n− 1)×m+ 1)(m+ 1) numbers,
(κ, χ, φ,Λ0,0, . . . ,Λ(n−1)×m,m) where we have conditions Λ0,0 = Λ(n− 1)×m,m = 0 and a third linear
condition as described above.
5.3 Strategies and payoffs in a public goods game
We can now write the relationship between the players’ scores when players do not pay attention to the
identity of their opponents as
φ
n−1∑
i=1
Si
n− 1 − χ(S
0 − κ)− φκ+
(n−1)×m∑
lo=0
m∑
lp=0
Λlo,lpvlo,lp = 0.
In the case when one player uses strategy Y and the rest use strategy X we then have the following
relationship between scores:
φSY
1
n− 1 + φS
X n− 2
n− 1 − χ(S
X − κ)− φκ+
(n−1)×m∑
lo=0
m∑
lp=0
Λlo,lpvlo,lp = 0. (16)
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The strategy of a focal player in a public goods game can then be written as
plo,lp =
lp
m
+ κ(φ− χ) +
(
B
lo + lp
n×m − C
lp
m
)
χ−
(
B
lo + lp
n×m − C
lo
(n− 1)×m
)
φ− Λlo,lp (17)
Since a viable strategy must have 0 ≤ plo,lp ≤ 1 we see by looking at p0,0 and p(n−1)×m,m that
0 ≤ κ ≤ B − C
and
φ > χ
with additional constraints on the other parameters. This in turn implies that a cooperator, for which
p(n−1)×m,m = 1 necessitates κ = B − C and a defector, for which p0,0 = 0 necessitates κ = 0.
6 Equilibrium rates of play
We now derive some inequalities that, in combination with Eq. 11, will allow us to identify the strategies
that are evolutionary robust in n-player games. In general, we can write the score of a focal player with
resident strategy X as
SX =
(n−1)×m∑
lo=0
m∑
lp=0
(
B
lo + lp
n×m − C
lp
m
)
vlo,lp
Similarly the score of an opponent with a strategy Y , is given by
SY =
(n−1)×m∑
lo=0
m∑
lp=0
(
B
lo + lp
n×m − C
lp
m
)
wlo,lp
where wlo,lp are the equilibrium rates of play from Y ’s perspective. When there is only a single Y mutant
in a game, then from Y ’s perspective, all opponents are identical and use strategy X. In this situation
we can write
vlo,lp =
min[m,lo]∑
l′p=max[0,lo+lp−(n−1)×m]
wlo+lp−l
′
p,l
′
p
((n− 1)×m− lo − lp + l′p)!
(m− lp)!((n− 2)×m− lo + l′p)!
(lo + lp − l′p)!
lp!(lo − l′p)!
m!((n− 2)×m)!
((n− 1)×m)!
(18)
where we assume wlo+lp−l
′
p,l
′
p = 0 for the unphysical case l′p > lo. This allows us to write the score of X
in terms of wlo,lp . We will now use these results to explore two special cases of interest: (i) The effect of
increasing the size of the game n with fixed memory, and (ii) the effect of increasing memory size m with
fixed game size.
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7 Bounds on players’ scores
We can now use Eq. 14 to find upper and lower bounds on the difference and the sum of players’ scores,
in the case that the game contains a single player using a strategy Y and n− 1 players using a strategy
X.
SX =
(n−1)×m∑
lo=0
m∑
lp=0
(
B
lo + lp
n×m − C
lo
(n− 1)×m
)
wlo,lp
We can now write the difference between the scores of X and Y scores as
SX − SY =
(n−1)×m∑
lo=0
m∑
lp=0
C
lp(n− 1)− lo
(n− 1)×m w
lo,lp
which enables us to identify upper and lower bounds on the difference between two players’ scores, namely
SX − SY ≥ −
(n−1)×m∑
lo=0
m∑
lp=0
C
lo
(n− 1)×mw
lo,lp (19)
which becomes an equality when Y always defects at equilibrium and
SX − SY ≤
(n−1)×m∑
lo=0
m∑
lp=0
C
(n− 1)×m− lo
(n− 1)×m w
lo,lp (20)
which becomes an equality when Y never defects at equilibrium. We can similarly write, for the sum of
the player’s scores,
SX + SY
1
n− 1 =
(n−1)×m∑
lo=0
m∑
lp=0
(B − C) lo + lp
(n− 1)×mw
lo,lp .
This gives an upper bound on the sum
SX + SY
1
n− 1 ≤
n
n− 1(B − C)−
(n−1)×m∑
lo=0
m∑
lp=0
(B − C)n×m− lo − lp
(n− 1)×m w
lo,lp . (21)
which becomes an equality when w0,0 = 0 at equilibrium (i.e it is never the case that all players defect).
Finally we have a lower bound on the sum
SX1 + S
Y
1
1
n− 1 ≥
(n−1)×m∑
lo=0
m∑
lp=0
(B − C) lo + lp
(n− 1)×mw
lo,lp . (22)
which becomes an equality when w(n−1)×m,m = 0, (i.e it is never the case that all players cooperate at
equilibrium).
It is also convenient to rewrite Eq. 12 for the relationship between two player’s scores in terms of w
to give
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SY
1
n− 1 + S
X n− 2
n− 1 − (χ
0
1 + (m− 1)χ0m)(SX − κ)− κ+
(n−1)×m∑
lo=0
m∑
lp=0
 min[m,lo]∑
k=max[0,lo+lp−(n−1)×m]
Λlo+lp−k,k
((n− 1)×m− lo)!
(m− k)!((n− 2)×m− lo + k)!
lo!
k!(lo − k)!
m!((n− 2)×m)!
((n− 1)×m)!
wlo,lp = 0.
(23)
We can now use Eqs. 16-20 to identify the strategies that are evolutionary robust, under strong
selection, in multi-player games.
7.1 Robust strategies
We focus here on the prospects for cooperation in iterated games. In particular, we identify strategies
which, when used by all players in a game, ensure that all players cooperate. This is achieved quite
simply by setting pn−1,1 = 1 so that if all players cooperated in the preceding round, all players assuredly
cooperate in the following round. We call these strategies the cooperators and we calculate the robustness
of these strategies by determining the proportion of cooperators that can resist invasion by all other
strategies. We contrast this to the defectors: strategies which have p0,0 = 0, such that if al players
defected in the preceding round, all players assuredly defect in the following round. The importance of
these two strategy classes in two-player public goods games has been established already [3], making it
natural to generalise their study to games with multiple players and long memory.
To determine whether a strategy is robust we use the condition given previously for an evolving
population of N players in a multiplayer game. Given a resident strategy X in a population, selection
acts against a new mutant Y provided TX(1) > T Y (1), as described above. This can be written explicitly
in terms of players’ scores as
N − n
N − 1S
X
0 +
n− 1
N − 1S
X
1 > S
Y
1 (24)
where SX0 is the score received by X with no mutants in the game, S
X
1 is the score received by X with
one mutant player Y in the game and SY1 is the score received by Y with no other mutants in the game.
7.2 Robust cooperating strategies under strong selection
We first identify the cooperating strategies that are robust under strong selection. As defined above, a
cooperating strategy X is such that, if all players use the strategy, all players cooperate every turn at
equilibrium. Such strategies must have κ = B − C.
A mutant strategy Y can selectively invade a cooperating strategy under strong selection iff
SY1 − SX1 >
N − n
N − 1 (B − C − S
X
1 )
Thhe longterm payoffs must additionally satisfy Eq. 17-21. We can therefore identify strategies X which
cannot be selectively invaded by any mutant Y . For simplicity we write
Λˆlo,lp =
min[m,lo]∑
k=max[0,lo+lp−(n−1)×m]
Λlo+lp−k,k
((n− 1)×m− lo)!
(m− k)!((n− 2)×m− lo + k)!
lo!
k!(lo − k)!
m!((n− 2)×m)!
((n− 1)×m)! .
(25)
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Case I: Robustness when χ ≤ N(n−2)+1(N−1)(n−1)φ
Using Eq. 19 we can write the condition for invasion by a mutant strategy Y as
(
N(n− 2) + 1
(N − 1)(n− 1)φ− χ
)
(SX1 − (B − C)) < −
(n−1)×m∑
lo=0
m∑
lp=0
Λˆlo,lpwlo,lp (26)
combining Eq. 15 with Eq. 19 then gives
N − n
N − 1
(n−1)×m∑
lo=0
m∑
lp=0
Λˆlo,lpwlo,lp < C
(
N(n− 2) + 1
(N − 1)(n− 1)φ− χ
) (n−1)×m∑
lo=0
m∑
lp=0
C
lo
(n− 1)×mw
lo,lp (27)
as a necessary condition for invasion.
Case II: Robustness when χ > N(n−2)+1(N−1)(n−1)φ
Combining Eq. 17 and Eq. 19 we can also write
N − n
N − 1
(n−1)×m∑
lo=0
m∑
lp=0
Λˆlo,lpwlo,lp < (B − C)
(
N(n− 2) + 1
(N − 1)(n− 1)φ− χ
) (n−1)×m∑
lo=0
m∑
lp=0
n×m− lo − lp
(n− 1)×m w
lo,lp
(28)
as a necessary condition for robustness.
Thus, in summary, the set of robust cooperating strategies in an n-player game under strong selection
with memory-m, which we denote Cn,ms , is given by:
Cn,ms =
{
(χ, φ, κ,Λ0,1, . . .Λ(n−1)×m,m−1)
∣∣∣∣κ = B − C,
N − n
N − 1
(n−1)×m∑
lo=0
m∑
lp=0
Λˆlo,lpwlo,lp ≥ C
(
φ
N(n− 2) + 1
(N − 1)(n− 1) − χ
) (n−1)×m∑
lo=0
m∑
lp=0
lo + lp
(n− 1)×mw
lo,lp ,
N − n
N − 1
(n−1)×m∑
lo=0
m∑
lp=0
Λˆlo,lpwlo,lp ≥ (B − C)
(
φ
N(n− 2) + 1
(N − 1)(n− 1) − χ
) (n−1)×m∑
lo=0
m∑
lp=0
n×m− lo − lp
(n− 1)×m w
lo,lp
}
(29)
7.3 Robust defecting strategies under strong selection
We now identify the defecting strategies that are robust under strong selection. As defined above, a
defecting strategy X is one such that, if all players adopt the strategy, all players defect every turn at
equilibrium. Such strategies must have κ = 0.
A mutant strategy Y can selectively invade a defecting strategy under strong selection iff
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SX1 − SY1 <
N − n
N − 1S
X
1
Using Eq. 19 this can be re-written as
SX1
(
N(n− 2) + 1
(N − 1)(n− 1)φ− χ
)
< −N − n
N − 1
(n−1)×m∑
lo=0
m∑
lp=0
Λˆlo,lpwlo,lp (30)
Following the same procedure as for the cooperators above, we find that the set of robust defecting
strategies in an n-player game under strong selection with memory-m, which we denote Dn,1s , is given by
Dn,ms =
{
(χ, φ, κ,Λ0,1, . . .Λ(n−1)×m,m−1)
∣∣∣∣κ = 0,
N − n
N − 1
(n−1)×m∑
lo=0
m∑
lp=0
Λˆlo,lpwlo,lp ≥ −(B − C)
(
φ
N(n− 2) + 1
(N − 1)(n− 1) − χ
) (n−1)×m∑
lo=0
m∑
lp=0
lo + lp
(n− 1)×mw
lo,lp ,
N − n
N − 1
(n−1)×m∑
lo=0
m∑
lp=0
Λˆlo,lpwlo,lp ≥ −C
(
φ
N(n− 2) + 1
(N − 1)(n− 1) − χ
) (n−1)×m∑
lo=0
m∑
lp=0
n×m− lo − lp
(n− 1)×m w
lo,lp
}
(31)
Notice that in the special case n = N , in which all members of a population play the same public goods
game together, the conditions for robustness are independent of Λlo,lp .
7.4 Calculating robust volumes
We have now derived necessary and sufficient conditions for cooperators and defectors to be robust in n-
player public goods games. However, in contrast to the case of two-player games these conditions depend
explicitly on the equilibrium play wlo,lp of an invading mutant. We can nonetheless easily construct
strategies that are assuredly robust, by using the fact that wlo,lp ≤ 1 for all possible mutants. Similarly
we can construct strategies that are assuredly invadable. However this leaves a large subset of strategies
whose robustness depends on the actual values of wlo,lp . Nonetheless we can still determine their robustness
by using the fact that the bounds on players scores render the conditions Eqs. 26 and 27 most stringent
when a mutant plays such that (1) he never cooperates at equilibrium (Eq. 16), (2) he plays so that
w0,0 = 0 at equilibrium, i.e so that all players do not defect simultaneously (Eq. 18), (3) he always
cooperates at equilibrium (Eq. 17) or (4) he plays such that all players do not cooperate simultaneously
(Eq. 19). This leaves us with four possible trigger strategies to test in order to determine the robustness
of a cooperator or defector strategy (where the relevant trigger strategy depends on the values of φ and
χ and whether the resident is a cooperator or a defector).
Figure 3 of the main text verifies the use of these four trigger strategies by comparing the analytically
predicted volumes of robust strategies to those estimated by Monte Carlo against a large number of
randonly chosent mutant invaders. This type of Monte Carlo verification is also shown in Figure S1 for
the effect of population size N on the volume of robust strategies. As discussed in the main text, larger
populations leader to larger volumes of robust cooperators and smaller volumes of robust defectors.
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7.5 The impact of memory on robustness
As discussed in the main text, the impact of memory on robustness arises because it increases the capacity
for contingent punishment, as expressed through the parameters Λlo,lp . The way in which this occurs is
most clearly understood by looking at the expectation
〈
Λlo,lp
〉
for a randomly drawn strategy. For a
randomly drawn cooperating or defecting strategy the expectations 〈χ〉 and 〈φ〉 are related according to
(n− 1) 〈χ〉 = (n−1)C − 〈φ〉
1/2 = (B − C)(〈φ〉 − 〈χ〉)
which gives
〈χ〉 = n−1Cn − 12(B−C)n
〈φ〉 = n−1Cn + n−12(B−C)n
The expectation
〈
Λlo,lp
〉
for a randomly drawn cooperator is then〈
Λlo,lp
〉
=
1
2
lo + lp
n×m
which gives an average across all lo, lp of
〈Λ〉 = 1
4
Similarly, the expectation
〈
Λlo,lp
〉
for a randomly drawn defector is and the average Λ is〈
Λlo,lp
〉
= −1
2
n×m− (lo + lp)
n×m
which gives an average across all lo, lp of
〈Λ〉 = −1
4
If we now use Eq. 22 to determine the average
〈
Λˆlo,lp
〉
for a cooperators and defectors faced with a
mutant who cooperated lp times within their memory, we recover Fig S2. We see that a randomly drawn
cooperator tends to be more succesful at punishing a given mutant, while a randomly drawn defector
tends to become less successful, as memory increases.
7.6 Invasability and cost of memory
Our evolutionary simulations, Figure 4, show that in addition to increasing the overall robustness of
cooperation, memory capacity m tends to increase in small games. To understand this we must look
at the average fixation probability of mutations that increase memory by 1, versus those that decrease
memory by 1. This is shown in Figure S2c. We see that mutations that increase memory capacity
are more likely to fix than mutations that decrease memory capacity, regardless of the current resident
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memory capacity. Thus longer memories will tend to evolve on average. If we introduce a cost for memory,
so that a player’s overall payoff is reduced by a factor mCm, we see (Figure S2d) that mutations that
increase memory eventually become worse invaders than mutations that decrease memory. In such cases
an intermediate memory length evolves. Thus the evolution of memory depends on the costs associated
with longer memories, as well as the size of the game being played. As we see in Figure S2a, shorter
memories evolve, and much more slowly, when memory comes at a cost. Correspondingly (Figure S2b),
the effect of evolving longer memories has a much weaker effect on the evolution of cooperation, although
the general trend of reduced defection and increased cooperation is maintained.
7.7 Robustness and the dimension of strategy space
As discussed in the main text and shown in Figure 4, as memory increases the overall frequency of robust
cooperators and defectors that evolve tends to decline. This reflects the fact that the absolute volume of
robust strategies tends to decline as the dimension of strategy space increases - the probability of randomly
drawing a strategy from the n-dimensional unit cube, that also lies within a robust volume volume with
sides of fixed length, declines as a power of 1/n. This decline in the robust volumes of strategies with the
dimension of strategy space (both game size n and memory length m) is shown in Figure S4.
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Figure S1: The impact of population size on cooperation. We calculated the relative volumes of robust
cooperation – that is, the absolute volume of robust cooperative strategies divided by the total volume
of robust cooperators and defectors – and compared this to the relative volume of defectors (solid lines)
using Eqs. 2-3. We also verified these analytic results by randomly drawing 106 strategies and determining
their success at resisting invasion from 105 random mutants (points). We calculated player’s payoffs by
simulating 2 × 103 rounds of a public-goods game. We then plotted the relative volumes of robust
cooperators and robust defectors as a function of populations size N with fixed game size n = 2 and
memory length m = 1, (left) and m = 10 (right). In both cases the effect of increasing population size
is to increase the relative volume of cooperators and decrease that of defectors. In all calculations and
simulations we used cost C = 1 and benefit B as indicated in the figure
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Figure S2: Effectiveness of contingent punishment. We calculated 1(n−1)×m
∑
lo
〈
Λˆlo,lp
〉
for the average
punishment of a mutant who defected lp times within the memory of the resident strategy, for both
cooperators (blue) and defectors (red). As memory becomes longer, the average punishment increases for
cooperators, making strategies more likely to be robust, and decreases for defectors, making strategies
less likely to be robust.
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Figure S3: Invasibility of memory. We simulated co-evolution of memory and strategies as described in
Figure 4 of the main text, with an additional cost to having memory which reduces a player’s payoff
by cm × m. We see that (a) much shorter memories evolve for cm = 0.1 compared to cm = 0 and (b)
a correspondingly smaller amount of cooperation evolves. In order to understand why longer memory
strategies evolve in small games we looked at the average fixation probability of mutations that increase
or decrease memory, when played against a randomly drawn resident strategy. We drew 106 resident
strategies for each memory length m ∈ {1, 2, 3, /ldots, 10} and for each drew 105 mutants that increase
memory length by 1 and 105 mutants that decrease memory length by 1. We assumed that a mutation
that increased memory length by 1 did not change the probability plo,lp of the player’s strategy. Where
mutations increased memory length, we randomly drew probabilities p(n−1)(m+1),lp and plo,m+1. (c) Plot-
ted are the average fixation probabilities for mutations that increase (black dots) or decrease (gray dots)
memory by 1. Each point shows the probability of in versus out transition for the state k (i.e mutations
that result in increase in memory from k to k + 1 and mutations that result in decrease in memory from
k + 1 to k). When there is no cost to memory, mutations that increase memory length are always better
invaders, for games of size n = 2. (d) When there is a cost to memory, mutations that decrease memory
length do relatively better, and mutations that increase memory length do relatively worse. As a result
we expect to see intermediate memory lengths evovle in the presence of costs.
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Figure S4: Absolute volumes of robust strategies. Here we show the same plot as in Figure 3 of the main
text, using absolute rather than relative volumes. As is clear, the absolute volumes of both cooperators
and defectors tends to decline as the dimension of strategy space increases. However this occurs at
different rates for the different strategy types depending on whether game size (left) or memory (right) is
increasing.
34
Literature Cited
[1] Press, W. H. and Dyson, F. J. Iterated prisoner’s dilemma contains strategies that dominate any
evolutionary opponent. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 109(26), 10409–13, Jun (2012).
[2] Akin, E. Stable cooperative solutions for the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. arXiv:1211.0969 (2012).
[3] Stewart, A. J. and Plotkin, J. B. Collapse of cooperation in evolving games. Proc Natl Acad Sci U
S A 111(49), 17558–63, Dec (2014).
[4] Hilbe, C., Traulsen, A., Wu, B., and Nowak, M. A. Zero-determinant alliances in multiplayer social
dilemmas. arXiv:1404.2886v1 (2014).
[5] Pan, L., Hao, D., Rong, Z., and Zhou, T. Zero-determinant strategies in the iterated public goods
game. arXiv:1402.3542v1 (2014).
[6] Fudenberg, D. and Maskin, E. Evolution and cooperation in noisy repeated games. American
Economic Review 80, 274–279 (1990).
[7] Traulsen, A., Nowak, M. A., and Pacheco, J. M. Stochastic dynamics of invasion and fixation. Phys
Rev E Stat Nonlin Soft Matter Phys 74(1 Pt 1), 011909, Jul (2006).
[8] Stewart, A. J. and Plotkin, J. B. From extortion to generosity, evolution in the iterated prisoner’s
dilemma. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 110(38), 15348–53, Sep (2013).
[9] Maynard Smith, J. The logic of animal conflict. Nature 246(158) (1973).
[10] Maynard Smith, J. Evolution and the theory of games. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
(1982).
35
